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ESSAYS

FACIAL AND AS-APPLIED CHALLENGES TO THE
INDIVIDUAL MANDATE OF THE PATIENT
PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
Edward A. Hartnett *
I. THROUGH A GLASS, DARKLY

For a time, the law governing facial, as opposed to as-applied,
constitutional challenges was, it seemed, simple to state. There
was a general rule and a First Amendment exception. The general rule was that facial challenges were rare, disfavored, and
could succeed only if the challenger convinced the court that there
were no circumstances under which the challenged statute could
be constitutionally applied. As the Supreme Court put it in United States v. Salerno, it had "not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment," and
that in all other contexts, a facial challenge could succeed only by
showing that "no set of circumstances exists under which the Act

would be valid."' The exception, the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, enabled a challenger to show that, although his
own conduct was not constitutionally protected, the statute was
sufficiently broad that it also applied to others whose conduct was
constitutionally protected, and therefore could not constitutional

* Richard J. Hughes Professor for Constitutional and Public Law and Service, Seton
Hall University School of Law. J.D., 1985, New York University School of Law; A.B., 1982,
Harvard College. Thanks to John Jacobi and Frank Pasquale for helpful comments.
1. 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
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ly be applied to anyone. This overbreadth doctrine was designed
to avoid the chilling of free speech.'
Outside of the First Amendment, unless a litigant could meet
the stringent test for a facial challenge, he could only mount an
as-applied challenge, one that would be successful only if the
statute was unconstitutional as applied to him, and one whose
impact would be similarly limited. If all he could show is that the
statute would be unconstitutional as applied to some hypothetical
other, his challenge would fail, the statute would be enforced
against him, and the possibility that some hypothetical other
might have a legitimate constitutional claim would be left for another day.'
This seemingly neat doctrine began to give way under analytic
pressure. Perhaps not surprisingly, the first pressure point on the
Supreme Court involved abortion. Justice Scalia, who found no
warrant in the Constitution for abortion rights in the first place,
called for subjecting challenges to statutes regulating abortion to
Salerno's stringent test for facial challenges.' Justice Stevens,
who defended abortion rights, labeled the Salerno statement a
"rhetorical flourish" rather than an accurate statement of the
law.' Although not deciding whether Salerno's test applies in the
abortion area, the Court in a later abortion case stated that a
court "confronting a constitutional flaw in a statute" should generally "try to limit the solution to the problem," preferring "to enjoin only the unconstitutional applications of a statute while leaving the other applications in force."6 It acted on this statement in
Gonzales v. Carhart, rejecting a facial challenge to the federal
statute banning partial-birth abortion, leaving to later litigation
the possibility that it might be unconstitutional as applied to
some situations.'

2. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S.
88, 97-98 (1940).
3. See Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R. Co. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217, 219-20
(1912).
4. See Janklow v. Planned Parenthood, 517 U.S. 1174, 1178 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) denying cert. to Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452 (8th Cir. 1995).
5. Id. at 1175 (Stevens, J., respecting the denial of certiorari).
6. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood, 546 U.S. 320, 328-29 (2006).
7. 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007). Whether for strategic reasons or lack of any instances
where the prohibited procedure was necessary, it appears that no such litigation was ever
brought. Cf. Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Herring, 570 F.3d 165 (4th Cir. 2009) (en
banc) (rejecting an attempt to characterize a case filed before the Carhartdecision as an
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With the spotlight turned on the issue of facial challenges, it
became more and more clear that the simple statement of a general rule with a First Amendment exception was deceptivelysimple, if not downright wrong. The Rehnquist Court decisions
holding federal statutes unconstitutional for exceeding Congressional power under the Commerce Clause were decisions of facial
invalidity.! So, too, were a number of decisions finding federal
statutes unconstitutional for exceeding Congressional power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.' (On the other hand,
there were also decisions concluding that a statute, challenged as
exceeding Congressional power under Section Five, was constitutional as applied to the case before the Court, even though it
might have unconstitutional applications.)" The Booker decision
held the federal sentencing statute facially unconstitutional for
violating the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial."
In recent years, the Court has frequently (but certainly not always) been quite self-conscious about the growing recognition
that facial challenges are more broadly accepted than the simple
rule suggests. This self-consciousness was perhaps most visible in
Sabri v. United States, where the Court rejected a facial challenge
to a federal statute under the Spending Clause and appended an
afterword to its opinion discouraging facial attacks alleging overbreadth, while listing free speech, the right to travel, abortion,
and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as among the "relatively few settings" in which such facial attacks have been recognized."
Scholars have demonstrated that facial challenges are more
common and more successful than the Court has acknowledged,
such as in cases involving the Equal Protection Clause and the
Establishment Clause.'" In an article published this summer, Pro-

appropriate as-applied challenge).
8. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000); United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995).
9. See Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001); Kimel v.
Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000).
10. See United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 158-59 (2006); Tennessee v. Lane, 541
U.S. 509, 530-31 (2004).
11. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 248 (2005).
12. 541 U.S. 600, 602, 608-10 (2004).

13.

See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46

STAN. L. REV. 235, 238-39 (1994); Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth:Facial Challenges and the Valid Rule Requirement, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 359, 361 (1998).
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fessor Richard Fallon makes a powerful case that even these
scholarly critics have understated the point.14 By his count, based
on a study of six Supreme Court Terms between 1984 and 2009,
facial challenges are not only more common than as-applied challenges but also have a higher success rate." Apart from the numbers, he argues that a survey of leading cases across a "broad
range of constitutional provisions" show that the Court "has held
statutes wholly invalid under nearly every provision of the Constitution under which it has adjudicated challenges to statutes."16
In addition to cases under the Equal Protection and Establishment Clauses, he points to cases arising under the Qualifications
Clause, the Presentment Clause, the Suspension Clause, the Contracts Clause, the Import-Export Clause, the dormant Commerce
Clause, and the Eighth Amendment, as well as cases involving
presidential power under Article II, judicial power under Article
III, and structural assumptions of federalism." Indeed, for Fallon,
the "conventional wisdom regarding facial challenges" is,
"[n] early across the board. . . more wrong than right."
II. THESE THREE REMAIN
Despite the confusion inherent in a situation where there is
such divergence between the oft-stated rule and the actual practice, three things are nevertheless clear about facial versus asapplied challenges. The first is that the actual impact of a decision depends more on the law of preclusion and precedent than on
the labels given to the challenges. Second, the distinction between
facial and as-applied constitutional decisions is not so much a dichotomy between two separate categories but more a range within in-between gradations. Third, whether a statute is held unconstitutional on its face or as-applied turns, to a considerable
extent, on the substantive constitutional doctrine brought to bear
in a given area of the law.
Regardless of whether a judge in a particular case describes his
holding as facial or as-applied, the actual impact will depend

14. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Fact and Fiction About Facial Challenges, 99 CALIF. L.
REV. 915, 917 (2011).
15. Id. at 917-18.
16. Id. at 935.
17. Id. at 935-38.
18. Id. at 917.
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more on the permissible scope of any injunction, the law of preclusion, and the law of precedent." Imagine a district judge dismissing a federal indictment on the grounds that the statute relied upon is unconstitutional on its face. That decision by itself,
apart from any appeal, prevents the government from prosecuting that defendant under that statute, but has no power, under
the law of preclusion, to prevent the government from prosecuting a different defendant.20 Nor does it, under the law of precedent, bind any judge in higher courts, other district courts, or
even judges in that same district." The judge may describe the
ruling as one of facial invalidity, but the statute lives on-not only in the statute books, as statutes do until repealed, regardless of
what judges say about them-but also in actual operation. On the
other hand, imagine a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States holding a statute unconstitutional as applied, but based
on reasons that apply to all (or virtually all) actual applications of
that statute. The Court might not describe its holding as one of
facial invalidity, but the law of precedent will mean that it has
that effect (or nearly so).22
As the parenthetical qualifiers in the last sentence suggest, the
distinction between facial and as-applied decisions represents a
range rather than dichotomous separate categories. The Supreme
Court's decision in City of Boerne v. Flores presents a classic example.22 In that case, the Court held that the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act ("RFRA") exceeded Congressional power under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.24 Its decision was not
particularly tied to the facts of the case; it hardly mattered that
the case involved a claim that application of local land use law to
bar a planned expansion of a church violated RFRA, as opposed to
a claim that application of a state drug law to bar the consumption of peyote violated RFRA.2 5 That is, it seems like a decision
19. See id. at 923 n.31. Indeed, Professor Fallon goes so far as to suggest that "we
would do better to drop the term 'facial challenge' entirely when talking about lower court
rulings," because the term "tends to obscure issues involving the precedential and preclusive effects of lower court judgments and the appropriate scope of judicial injunctions." Id.
at 924 n.31.
20. See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 155 (1984).

21.

See Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Prece-

dents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 824 (1994).
22. See Fallon, supra note 14, at 950.

23. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
24. Id. at 512.
25.

See id. at 532; cf. Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874
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that RFRA is unconstitutional on its face, rather than as applied.
And to a very large extent it is: under Boerne, RFRA cannot constitutionally be applied to state (and local) government action.26
But nothing in the reasoning of Boerne calls into doubt its validity as applied to national action; as to that, Congress need not rely
on the Fourteenth Amendment."
This leads to the third point that is clear in this area: whether
a statute is held unconstitutional on its face or as-applied turns,
to a considerable extent, on the substantive constitutional doctrine brought to bear in a given area of the law. Consider the Establishment Clause: to the extent that the Court relies on the
Lemon test and determines that a statute lacks a secular purpose, the statute is unconstitutional on its face.28 The particular
application of the statute does not matter. Consider on the other
extreme, the limits imposed by the Due Process Clause on state
court jurisdiction: the minimum contacts and reasonableness
tests of InternationalShoe and its progeny look to the particulars
of the individual case.29
I argue that this third point should lead to another: instead of
treating substantive doctrine as given, whatever its impact on
producing determinations of facial or as-applied validity or invalidity, courts should shape substantive constitutional doctrine
with an awareness of the extent to which that doctrine will tend
to produce judicial decisions that decide the constitutionality of a
statute on its face.o Because I believe that courts are, in general,
better suited to adjudicating on an as-applied basis, I think that
courts should, in general, shape constitutional doctrine in a way
that tends to produce as-applied judicial decisions. 1 Concededly,
this may seem a rather abstract point, and once some doctrine is

(1990).
26. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532.
27. See Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418,
438-39 (2006).

28. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
29.

J. McIntyre Mach. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S.

,

_,

131 S. Ct. 2780, 2787 (2011);

Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980); Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
316 (1945).
30. See Edward Hartnett, Modest Hope for a Modest Roberts Court: Deference, Facial
Challenges, and the Comparative Competence of Courts, 59 SMU L. REV. 1735, 1753
(2006).
31. See id.
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in place in a substantive area of the law there may be considerable reluctance to refashion it in this direction, given the general
path dependency of a legal system with a doctrine of precedent."
III. HOPE AGAINST HOPE
What does any of this have to do with challenges to the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act? The central issue on the merits is whether the individual mandate is within Congressional
power under the Commerce Clause. In keeping with the premise
of this symposium, I am not going to discuss the merits themselves, but rather the extent to which the merits might be approached on an as-applied, as opposed to a facial, basis.
Existing Commerce Clause doctrine is hardly hospitable to asapplied adjudication. The modern cases finding violations of the
Commerce Clause, Lopez and Morrison, were determinations of
facial unconstitutionality." The aggregation principle of Wickard
v. Filburn, which calls for the impact of individuals' behavior to
be added together in order to find a substantial effect on interstate commerce,34 pulls strongly away from as-applied challenges.
The Court has repeatedly stated, most recently in Gonzales v.
Raich, that "[w]here the class of activities is regulated and that
class is within the reach of federal power, the courts have no
power 'to excise, as trivial, individual instances' of the class.""1
And Raich upheld the federal prohibition on marijuana, rejecting
the argument, accepted by Justice Thomas in dissent, that the
statute was unconstitutional as applied to medical marijuana patients largely outside the interstate drug market." In these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that some think that there can

32. Cf. Fallon, supra note 14 at 948 ("Given a rule of decision, the Justices will apply
it, with no further preference for narrow, as-applied analysis.").
33. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000); United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995).
34. 317 U.S. 111, 124-25 (1942).
35. 545 U.S. 1, 23 (2005) (quoting Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971)).
The same passage appears in several other cases. Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps
of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 15, 194 n.15 (2001); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n,
452 U.S. 264, 308 (1981); see also Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 192-93 (1968) ("The
contention that in Commerce Clause cases the courts have power to excise, as trivial, individual instances falling within a rationally defined class of activities has been put entirely
to rest.").
36. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 14 (2005); id. at 57-58 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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be no such thing as a (successful) as-applied challenge based on
the Commerce Clause.
In light of all this, odds are that the Supreme Court will either
find the individual mandate constitutional on its face, following
cases like Wickard and Raich, and foreclosing the possibility of
as-applied challenges, or unconstitutional on its face, following
cases like Lopez and Morrison, and foreclosing the possibility that
it could be constitutionally applied in some instances.
But not necessarily.
The Court is being called upon to make new law, whatever it
decides." Sure, each side believes that its view is in better accord
with and better accounts for the precedents, but all must admit
that the Supreme Court has never adjudicated a Commerce
Clause challenge to a statute that requires individuals to buy a
product in a private market in which they are not otherwise participating. From the perspective of the challengers, the defenders
of the statute are asking the Court to endorse a dangerous new
principle, that Congress may force individuals who are not engaged in economic activity in a given market to enter that market
against their will. From the perspective of the defenders, the
challengers are asking the Court to impose a new, heretofore unheard of, limitation on Congressional power. The novelty of whatever it does puts the Court in a better position, should it so
choose, to formulate the new doctrine in a way that takes into account how that doctrine affects the availability of facial and asapplied challenges.
Moreover, Judge Sutton has put the issue on the table, showing
how it can be done." This is of greater importance than might appear at first blush, because the Court has admitted that it some37. See Fallon, supra note 14 at 936 (noting that Raich "can be read as rejecting the
possibility of successful as-applied challenges to assertions of legislative power under the
Commerce Clause and thus as establishing that all attacks must be facial if they are to
have any chance at success") (citations omitted); see also Transcript of Oral Argument at
15, Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2004) (No. 03-1454) (providing that Solicitor General
Clement stated that the statute could never have an unconstitutional application because,
although "an as-applied challenge can be brought ... the legal test that's applied in the asapplied challenge is one that considers the constitutionality of the statute as a whole.").
38. 'The mandate, it should be recognized, is indeed somewhat novel, but so too, for
all its elegance, is appellants' argument." Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 16 (D.C. Cir.
2011).
39. Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 565-66 (6th Cir. 2011) (Sutton,
J., concurring).
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times overlooks the possibility of insisting on an as-applied determination, if the parties seek all-or-nothing facial determinations.40 His concurring opinion in Thomas More Law Center v.
Obama concludes that the individual mandate of the Affordable
Care Act is constitutional on its face, while holding open the possibility that as-applied challenges might succeed.4 1 He explains
that there are at least four settings in which the individual mandate can constitutionally be applied, and that this is enough to
preserve the statute from facial invalidity. In particular, he
points:
(1) to individuals who already have purchased insurance voluntarily
and who want to maintain coverage, but who will be required to obtain more insurance in order to comply with the minimum-essentialcoverage requirement;
(2) to individuals who voluntarily obtained coverage but do not wish
to be forced (at some intermediate point in the future) to maintain it;
(3) to individuals who live in states that already require them to obtain insurance and who may have to obtain more coverage to comply
with the mandate or abide by other requirements of the Affordable
Care Act; and
(4) to individuals under 30, no matter where they live and no matter
whether they have purchased health care before, who may satisfy
42
the law by obtaining only catastrophic-care coverage.

Judge Sutton acknowledges that "[s]ome theories of invalidity
necessarily apply to all applications of a law," and therefore do
not lend themselves to as-applied evaluation.4 3 But he contends
that other theories-particularly the proposed action/inaction
limitation on congressional power-do lend themselves to asapplied evaluation." As he sees it, if a court were to accept some
variant of the idea that Congress may not regulate inactivity under the Commerce Clause, that new doctrine could be utilized on
an as-applied basis. He explains that nothing in his view of the
case
precludes individuals from bringing as-applied challenges to the
mandate as the relevant agencies implement it, and as the "lessons
taught by the particular" prove (or disprove) that Congress crossed a
constitutional line in imposing this unprecedented requirement. Just

40. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood, 546 U.S. 320, 331 (2006) (noting that "the parties
in Stenberg did not ask for, and we did not contemplate, relief more finely drawn").
41.
42.
43.
44.

Thomas More Law Center, 651 F.3d at 565-66.
Id. at 565.
Id. at 556.
Id.
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as courts should refrain from needlessly pre-judging the invalidity of
a law's many applications, they should refrain from doing the same
45
with respect to their validity.

IV.

RUBIN VASES

I think that Judge Sutton is right that at least some of the
challengers' theories lend themselves to as-applied adjudication,"
although I also think there is more ambiguity to the point than
his opinion suggests. Indeed, reflecting on his opinion leads me to
believe that it is not only that substantive constitutional doctrine
affects the availability of facial versus as-applied challenges, but
that the very same substantive constitutional doctrinal limitation
can sometimes be conceptualized and articulated either in a way
that leads to facial evaluation or in a way that leads to as-applied
evaluation-and that courts should be self-conscious about the
decision to articulate it one way or another. That is, although
some doctrines lend themselves readily to facial determinations of
constitutionality (e.g., doctrines that look for legislative purpose),
while others lend themselves readily to as-applied determinations
of constitutionality (e.g., doctrines that look to particular adjudicative facts), sometimes the same basic principle can be conceptualized and stated in two different ways, one that lends itself to
facial determinations and one that lends itself to as-applied determinations.
This principle may initially appear surprising, and then obvious.47 It can be seen in widely divergent constitutional areas, including the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment,4 8 the Due Process Clause's limitation on abortion regula-

45. Id. at 566 (citation omitted).
46. The challengers in the D.C. Circuit, "unlike the plaintiffs before the Sixth Circuit, ... were careful to avoid conceding there were any valid applications of the law," and
pursued a "theory of the Commerce Clause [that] would invalidate virtually all conceivable
applications of the mandate." Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2011). But to
do so, they painted themselves into a corner, arguing that even if Congress could require
individuals to buy insurance when they sought medical care, it lacked the authority to
oblige them to keep it. The price of attempting to avoid the facial challenge objection was
to render the argument "rather unpersuasive on the merits," because "Congress ...

would.

..

clearly have the power to impose insurance purchase conditions on persons who

appeared at a hospital for medical services." Id. at 18.
47. Cf. Fallon, supra note 14, at 950 (noting that the "path to a better understanding"

in this area "starts with two banalities" that "deserve reemphasis").
48. See U.S. CONST. amend VIII.
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tions," and the Due Process Clause's limitation on personal jurisdiction."o And it can be seen in the proposed Commerce Clause
limitation on regulating inaction.
My point is not that all constitutional principles can be conceptualized and stated in two different ways, one that lends itself to
facial determinations and one that lends itself to as-applied determinations. For example, the Eighth Amendment has been interpreted to require "that where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a
human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be
suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly
arbitrary and capricious action."" That principle plainly lends itself to facial determinations: a given statute (at least as judicially
interpreted)" either suitably constrains the sentencer's discretion
or it does not. Under that principle, if the statute does not suitably constrain discretion, the statute cannot constitutionally be
applied to anyone; the statute has to be fixed if capital punishment is going to be implemented. And that, of course, is precisely
what happened in the wake of Furman." It is difficult to see how
that principle could be conceptualized and articulated in a way
that would avoid facial determinations and favor as-applied challenges.
But the Eighth Amendment has also been interpreted to bar
the execution of those who were minors at the time of the offense." That principle could be conceptualized and articulated in
two different ways, one that would lend itself to facial determinations and one that would lend itself to as-applied determinations.
One could think of the principle as one that requires a capital
punishment statute to contain an exception for those who were
minors at the time of the offense. So understood, a capital punishment statute that lacked such an exception would be facially
unconstitutional, just as a statute that failed to provide adequate
constraint on a sentencer's discretion is facially unconstitutional.
The statute would have to be fixed to implement capital punish49. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).
50. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-73 (1985).
51. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (describing the holding of the fractured
Court in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)).
52. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 653-54 (1990).
53. Id. at 657, 659-60.
54. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
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ment. Alternatively, one could think of the principle as requiring
that a capital punishment statute not be used against someone
who was a minor at the time of the offense. Understood this way,
the principle lends itself readily toward as-applied adjudication:
If a death penalty statute makes no provision regarding the defendant's age, it is nonetheless facially constitutional; it simply
cannot be constitutionally applied to someone who was a minor at
the time of the offense. The statute need not be amended to make
it effective. Its reach is simply limited.
This is one way to understand the decision in CarhartII." The
majority was willing to accept, at least for purposes of the case,
the constitutional principle that the Due Process Clause gives a
woman a right to abortion when her health so requires." But it
conceptualized and articulated that principle as one that limited
the permissible reach of the statute, producing a conclusion that
the statute was facially constitutional but could be challenged asapplied to a mother whose health required the kind of abortion
forbidden by the statute." The dissenters, on the other hand, conceived of the same principle as one that required a statute prohibiting a form of abortion to include an exception for the health of
the mother." Since such an exception was not included in the text
of the statute, the statute was facially unconstitutional."
The minimum contacts test for personal jurisdiction is readily
understood as lending itself to as-applied constitutional determinations. A given statute or rule authorizing the exercise of personal jurisdiction is unconstitutional as applied to a defendant
who lacks the requisite minimum contacts, without calling into
doubt the validity of the statute or rule in general. But even here,
the constitutional principle can be conceptualized as a requirement that a statute authorizing personal jurisdiction be written
so as to exclude those who lack the requisite contacts. As odd as
that way of conceptualizing and articulating the minimum contacts standard may seem, given the enormous number of cases
using the test on an as-applied basis, it is one way of understanding the Schaffer v. Heitner decision." There, the Supreme Court
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
Id. at 167-68.
Id.
Id. at 171, 191 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 191.
433 U.S. 186 (1977).
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found facially unconstitutional a Delaware statute authorizing
personal jurisdiction based on ownership of shares in a Delaware
corporation, even though the defendants in that case-officers of
the corporation-almost certainly had minimum contacts with
the state and the claim concerned their conduct as officers of that
Delaware corporation."
Again, the point is not that all substantive constitutional principles have this Rubin-vase characteristic, but that some do. And
the proposed principle that, under the Commerce Clause, Congress cannot regulate inaction, or force people to enter a market,
is a substantive constitutional principle that does. Such a principle could be conceptualized and articulated as requiring that any
federal statute purporting to regulate commerce, in order to be
constitutional, must not regulate inaction or force people to enter
a market. If understood this way, the principle would call for a
conclusion of facial invalidity of the individual mandate of the Affordable Care Act. But such a principle could be conceptualized
and articulated as prohibiting the national government from using its commerce regulations against those who have not engaged
in relevant action or who have not entered the relevant market. If
understood this way, the principle would call for a conclusion that
the individual mandate of the Affordable Care Act is unconstitutional as applied to such individuals, but is nevertheless constitutional as applied to others.
V. PUT AWAY YOUR SWORD
If we are dealing with a principle that can be understood in
both ways, how might a court decide between them? One method
that seems to be in play, at least at an intuitive or unarticulated
level, may be a sense of how great a proportion of total likely applications of the statute are unconstitutional.6 2 Of all the death
penalty cases under a particular statute, those involving defend-

61. Id. at 189-90, 213-14.
62. That is, even when the Court is not explicitly using an overbreadth analysis it
may be doing something similar. See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615
(1973) (requiring, even in the First Amendment area, that any overbreadth be "substantial . . . in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep"); cf. Fallon, supra note 14, at
943, 945 (arguing that in "any linguistically natural sense of the term ...overbreadth facial challenges are actually quite common," in part because "the Court must sometimes
consider a statute's potential application to parties whose cases differ significantly from
that of the party before it").
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ants who were minors at the time of the offense seem to be a
small proportion. Of all the cases using a typical long-arm statute, those in which the defendants lacked minimum contacts sufficiently related to the claim would also seem to be a fairly small
proportion. By contrast, of all the cases in which jurisdiction
might be premised on ownership of shares of stock in a Delaware
corporation, those in which the claim sought to be adjudicated
had no relationship at all to those shares may seem a goodly proportion. And in Carhart II, some Justices seemed to disagree on
precisely how frequently there was any health need for the
banned procedure.63
But is there any other basis for choosing, beyond this sense of
proportion? I see three, two that I have noted before and one that
builds upon the insights of Richmond's own Professor Kevin
Walsh.
Professor Walsh has challenged the near-universal view that
the doctrine of severability is the only way to understand decisions holding that a statute can be validly applied to some cases
despite the existence (or possible existence) of unconstitutional
applications of that same statute." He argues that a better metaphor than severance-which suggests judges getting out a knife
and removing or subtracting invalid aspects of statutes-is the
metaphor of displacement-which, he contends, suggests judges
taking all relevant laws into account, adding them together, and
superimposing the displacing law where necessary over the displaced law." He contends that this is the way constitutional adjudication was conceptualized for the first several decades after the
founding."
There is considerable power in Professor Walsh's account, particularly the way that it fits with the classic (and to my mind, correct) view of the nature of constitutional adjudication as no different in kind from all other adjudication in which two conflicting
laws purport to govern a case and the court "must decide on the
operation of each," and "determine which of the conflicting rules

63.
64.
(2010).
65.
66.

Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 188-89 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Kevin C. Walsh, Partial Unconstitutionality, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 738, 739-40, 742
Id. at 747, 778.
Id. at 755-66.
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governs the case."" Whether those two laws are two statutes from
the same sovereign, a statute and a regulation from the same
sovereign, a statute and a common law doctrine from the same
sovereign, a federal statute and a state statute, a federal constitutional provision and a state statute, a federal constitutional
provision and a federal statute, a federal statute and a federal
treaty, or some other combination, a court-in order to decide
who wins the case-must invoke some rule of priority. Where two
statutes from the same sovereign are involved, or a federal statute and a treaty, the rule of priority is that the later in time prevails over the former; where a statute and a regulation, or a statute and a common law doctrine from the same sovereign are
involved, the rule of priority is that the statute prevails; where a
federal statute or constitutional provision and some state law are
involved, the Supremacy Clause supplies the rule of priority that
federal law prevails; where a federal statute and a federal constitutional provision are involved, the rule of priority is that the
constitutional provision prevails." If we think of constitutional
adjudication this way, rather than as something unique, we are
more likely to see the layers of law-state and federal; administrative, legislative and judicial; statutory and constitutional-as
forming a unified, overlapping whole," rather than see constitutional adjudication as cutting away, whether with an ex-acto
knife or meat cleaver, other laws. And if we see the whole body of
law this way, it will tend to pull us away from insisting that an
inferior law recite and include the provisions of higher law, as opposed to simply giving way to the extent higher law itself gov-

erns. 70

67. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803).
68. There may be important differences in these areas as to how readily the rule of
priority should be triggered, as opposed to attempting to reconcile the competing sources of
law. See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 231-32 (2000) (arguing that the
Supremacy Clause, by including a non obstante clause, indicates that courts should not try
to reconcile conflicting state and federal law, as traditional practice called for attempting
to reconcile conflicting statutes if the later-enacted statute lacked a non obstante clause);
see also PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing,

-

U.S.

-,

-,

131 S. Ct. 2567, 2579-80 (2011) (Thom-

as, J., for four Justices) (citing Nelson, supra, at 234-53).
69. See Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136-37 (1876); see also Tafflin v. Levitt, 493
U.S. 455, 469-70 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
70. Professor Fallon, operating within the severance metaphor, contends that the
Court assumes severability only when the lines on which a future cut can be made, if necessary, are reasonably clear. Fallon, supranote 14, at 956. From the perspective offered by
Professor Walsh, it would seem that any necessary clarity would need to come from the
constitutional doctrine itself. See Walsh, supra note 64, at 779. And if the Court cannot
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Second, I have argued that because legislators voting on bills,
and presidents deciding whether to sign or veto bills, must act on
the entire bundle presented to them, including provisions that
may have unconstitutional applications that they may not foresee, while courts can adjudicate individual applications of individual provisions of statutes, courts have a comparative competence in as-applied constitutional adjudication." Accordingly,
courts should shape doctrine to take advantage of this comparative competence. 72
Professor Fallon contends that this view depends on an embrace of Thayerism-the view that courts should defer to legislatures unless the constitutional error of the legislature is clear."
For him, stripped of its Thayerian premises, there is no reason to
discourage facial constitutional adjudication.7 4 And since almost
no one-and certainly no current Justice-is an across-the-board
Thayerian, there should be no general rule of preference for asapplied challenges.
I think Professor Fallon overstates the case. One need not be a
thorough-going Thayerian to hold that courts should be deferential to legislatures unless there is some good reason not to be.
And if one treats Thayerism as the default rule, subject to a less
deferential approach if there is some good reason to be less deferential, then one can properly believe that there should be a general rule, subject to exceptions, preferring as-applied challenges.

construct passably clear constitutional doctrine, it is not clear on what basis it properly
concludes that a statute is unconstitutional. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 283-84,
301-06 (2004).
71. See Hartnett, supra note 30, at 1745-46.
72. See id. at 1748.
73. Fallon, supra note 14, at 964-65 (citing James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of
the American Doctrine of ConstitutionalLaw, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 135 (1893)).
74. Id. at 965.
75. See id.
76. See Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 18 (D.C. Cir. 2011) ("We are obliged-and
this might well be our most important consideration-to presume that acts of Congress
are constitutional. Appellants have not made a clear showing to the contrary.") (citation
omitted).
77. Professor Fallon also too readily equates doctrine that results in as-applied adjudication as providing insufficient guidance to lower courts. See Fallon, supra note 14, 94748, 951. Doctrine that turns on the adjudicative facts of particular cases can provide plenty of guidance to lower courts, as the vast number of cases decided under International
Shoe's minimum contacts test reveals. This is not to say that the Court could not be doing
a better job in providing guidance in that area, but its failure in both Asahi Metal Indus.
Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102 (1987) and J. McIntyre Mach. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. _, 131
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There is a final reason why, all else being equal, it is better to
craft doctrine in a way that avoids up-or-down, winner-take-all,
facial determinations. Such doctrine is not necessarily a method
of more vigorously enforcing a constitutional limitation; it may
have the opposite effect. Instead, crafting doctrine in a way that
leads to up-or-down, winner-take-all, facial determinations increases the stakes, while crafting doctrine in a way that leads to
as-applied determinations lowers the stakes." Particularly in our
hyper-polarized political environment, raising the stakes strikes
me as unwise.
More than that, such an approach might even be destabilizing.
One of the functions that judicial review serves is to encourage
people who are deeply unhappy with the existing regime to seek
change within the legal system rather than take to the streets. I
do not claim that Justices consciously seek to co-opt potentially
destabilizing political movements, but judicial review tends to
serve that function. Giving one side-either side-of a grand battle a complete win undermines that function. Holding that a statute has some valid applications and some invalid applications
makes it more likely that both sides will feel heard and understood, rather than relegated to the streets.
CONCLUSION

There are many reasons to think that the Supreme Court will
provide an up-or-down determination regarding the constitutional validity of the individual mandate: existing Commerce Clause
doctrine is shaped in a way that discourages as-applied challenges, prior successful challenges under the Commerce Clause have
been facial challenges, and the as-applied challenge in Raich was
soundly rejected. But because the Court is being asked to articulate a principle for the first time, it is freer to capitalize on its
comparative competence, and, by following the path illuminated
by Judge Sutton, render a decision that lowers the stakes rather
than raises them.

S. Ct. 2780 (2011) to produce a majority opinion is not due to something inherent in asapplied adjudication. If, for example, the Court were to embrace Justice Brennan's view of
the stream of commerce, the resulting doctrine would be reasonably clear, govern an
enormous number of cases, give plenty of guidance to lower courts, and still produce asapplied constitutional adjudication. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 116-22 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
78. See Hartnett, supra note 30 at 1754-56.

